It is well known that security prevention mechanisms are not sufficient to protect efficiently an information system. Intrusion detection systems are required. But these systems present many imperfections. In particular, they can either generate false positives (i.e., alarms that should not be produced) or miss attacks (false negatives). However, the main problem is the generation of false positives that can overwhelm the information system administrator. In this paper, we follow the notion of correlation proposed by others. The objective is to aim at correlating either events in the analyser or alerts in the manager. We first present the ADeLe language, which provides a way to define the correlation properties. Then we present which algorithms have been carried out in our IDS to handle ADeLe signatures. Finally, we show the stress tests that have been applied to the probe algorithms that we have implemented.
Introduction
In common information systems, security is achieved by carrying out prevention mechanisms, such as authentication and access control, to enforce security policy. But this is not sufficient, because vulnerabilities remain. That is why it is actually also necessary to carry out intrusion detection mechanisms (IDS) in order to detect intrusions in the system. Two intrusion detection techniques have been proposed: misuse detection, which requires specific representation of computer system abuse (such as attack signatures), and anomaly detection. In this paper, we focus on misuse detection.
According to the IETF Intrusion Detection Working Group (IDWG), an IDS is composed of three elements: one or more sensors whose role Introduction
The ADeLe language [8] aims at describing all functional aspects relative to an attack, either from an attacker or from a system administrator point of view. These different aspects, described using a unique language, provide a way to build an attack database containing all necessary information for understanding how to carry out, detect, and react to an attack. This means that the description of an attack contains: the description of the exploitation of one or more vulnerabilities in order to compromise the system security policy (i.e., the attack scenario); the description of the attack from the target viewpoint, that provides a way of detecting the attack signature when it occurs; <EVENTS> CP : SNARE { event.name == "execve()"; path == "/bin/cp"; arguments MATCHES "cp /bin/sh *"; } CP0; OPEN: SNARE { event.
name == "open(O_WRONLY|O_CREAT)"; process.name == "cp"; attributes == "rwxr-xr-x"; } OPEN0; ... </EVENTS> the description of the appropriate response to be given to a detected attack.
In the following sections, we focus on the second aspect of the language, that is dedicated to the IDS detection process control. The signature is organised into three parts: the EVENT part that contains the filter definitions, the ENCHAIN part defines ordering relations on events, and the CONTEXT part describes the correlation contexts between the events.
Filtered Events
The ADeLe language correlation process is based on the use of filters. These filters describe what events or alerts must be used as elementary elements in the correlation process.
As shown on Figure 1 , an event filter is defined using its information source name (here Snare audit 1 ) and a name (here CP or OPEN are naming the types of the filter). The event filter describes what values are taken by the event attributes. The IDS will use this information to filter the audit data items, and elect the data items that fit this definition. Moreover, we can name a given instance of a filtered element. This name will be handled as a variable by the correlation operators we describe below (e.g., CP0 or OPEN0 ).
Correlation Operators
Once the events or alerts taken as inputs are filtered, ADeLe defines what are the correlations that must be applied between them. This leads to define ordering and occurences information on the filtered inputs. This is defined by means of five operators: Sequence, OneAmong, NonOrdered, Without and Repeat. These operators are used in order to define the signature of the attack. In the following subsections, we explain what is the meaning of each operator.
2.3.1
Sequence operator.
The sequence operator enables a description of a sequence of events. As shown on example 1 below, the sequence expression defines both temporal constraints on the element order, and the elements that are required to recognise the signature of the attack. In this example, we must detect three elements sequentially: A, B, then C in this given order. The formalism used to express the semantic of the operator is the chronicle formalism [4, 5] . This semantic shows us that three events must be detected, and gives the temporal constraints associated to their recognition.
Example 1
Syntax:
NonOrdered operator. The NonOrdered operator enables the description of a signature in which all elements must be recognised without any order constraint. The example below shows that all the three events A, B and C must be detected without time constraints between them.
Example 2
OneAmong operator. The OneAmong operator enables the description of the recognition of one expression among many. This actually defines a disjonction between the elements during a given detection. For a given attack, only the detection of one of the proposed elements is sufficient to ensure the detection of the signature. In the example below we show that A or B or C must be detected in order for the signature to be recognised.
Example 3
Without operator. The Without operator enables the description of how a positive signature detection can be removed if a negative signature is detected. The positive signature is the signature part that must be recognised to report an alert, and the negative signature is the signature part that produces the stop of the recognition. In the example below, the sequence A and B must not be reported if C is detected during the sequence detection. This operator provides a way to cancel a partial detection if a given event or expression occurs. The detection of the negative signature (here C ) cancels the detection of the positive signature(here Sequence(A,B)).
Example 4
Repeat operator. The Repeat operator enables the description of a repetition of an event or an expression. In the example below, we accept any set of 10 consecutive events A.
Example 5
Syntax: <ENCHAIN> Repeat(A, 10) </ENCHAIN> Semantic: i∈ [1, 10] event(A i ) ∧ i∈ [1, 9] t(A i ) < t(A i+1 )
2.3.6
Context correlation.
The operators describe signatures where the order of appearance of the detected elements is strictly defined. This is the first part of the correlation information required. The second part of the correlation deals with the values of attributes of the filtered events. It is thus necessary to define additional correlation between the elements detected. Eventually, the correlation is both temporal (temporal relations between the filtered events) and at the level of inter event values (relation between the attributes of the filtered events).
Time Constraints.
Defining timing constraints between the filtered events requires three operators: TimeOut, MinDelay, MaxDelay. These operators provide all required properties for defining temporal constraints in the attack detection. The TimeOut operator defines how much time a pending detection is valid until it is canceled. The MinDelay operator defines the minimum delay that must occur between two events. The MaxDelay defines how much time must exist between two events. Those operators are illustrated in Example 6. 
Constraints on inter event attributes.
In order to correlate successfully filtered events, the language enables the description of constraints on the event attributes. These constraints require that some attribute values must be linked with other event attribute values. In the example 7 below, the snare audit event attributes user.uid must be identical for the events A, B and C. 
Conclusion on ADeLe
Only the detection part of the ADeLe language has been described in the previous sections. This part of the language is used in the context of attack detection and in particular in the IDS presented in the next section. It must be noted that the ADeLe semantic is very close to the chronicles one, but that it is less general and much more adapted to the expression of signatures in the field of intrusion detection.
3.
An Intrusion Detection System The IDS that has been carried out is called GnG (for Gassata New Generation). It is designed to take both the role of an analyser or a manager inside the system, because it can take as input any audit data events as well as alerts in IDMEF [3] format.
The correlation can be applied at both levels (see Figure 2) . Correlation of events puts in relation multiple source audit data items and elects data on which correlation can be applied. Correlation of alerts takes as input IDMEF format from one or several analysers and elects the alerts that can contribute to the recognition of an attack signature. In both cases, the data in IDS entry are filtered to retain all events or alerts that can contribute to the evolution of signature recognition.
The ADeLe language is used at both level to define how the events or alerts can be correlated.
3.2
Events and Alerts correlation using finite state automata
In order to recognise the signatures of the ENCHAIN section, the IDS uses finite state automata. These automata are built automatically using the signature definitions. Each operator inside the signature is declined into an automaton to ensure the recognition. The goal of this automaton is to implement the multi-pattern matching detection algorithm. The table above (Figure 3) shows how each operator is translated to an equivalent automaton. This representation gives the semantic of these operators, but using another description model than in section 2.3.
However, they do not show only a semantic of the operators, but how the intrusion detection is handled in GnG internally.
3.3
Automaton merge The single operator automata that have been described in the previous section are merged to obtain the final signature automata. These final automata are used to perform detection of events or alerts. The algorithms required to merge the various single automata are not described in detail in this paper, but can be found in [7] . To illustrate the merge action, we show in Figure 4 the automaton equivalent to the signature Sequence(A, NonOrdered(B, C)).
3.4
Plan recognition
Plan definition.
A plan is an active entity that stores partially recognised attacks. It stores both the current states of automata and a history of all elements that have been accepted in a given partial recognition.
A plan in our model is a pair of two n-uplets. The first n-uplet is a list of automaton states that are currently active for this plan. The second n-uplet is a list of history items that have been accepted.
Plan evolution.
Our goal is to allow, if needed, the detection of all occurences of a given signature, e.g., for the Sequence(A, NonOrdered(B, C)) and the audit events a 1 , a 2 , b, c, we intend to detect two attacks: a 1 , b, c and a 2 , b, c. We use as an example the scenario illustrated in Figure 4 with the state numbers as defined in this figure. (6), (a2, b, c)) (detection) Figure 5 . Plan evolutions
Event Accepted Parent Plan Plans Produced
The Figure 5 shows what plans are produced when each event is received. In the example given in the table, we see several properties of the plan handling algorithm:
at the initialisation of the algorithm, a plan in the start state of the automaton with an empty history is initialised; a plan evolves when it faces an audit event that can contribute to its evolution; when a plan evolves via an event transition, the current plan is duplicated and produces a new plan; when a plan faces what we could call fork epsilon transitions (i.e., state duplication), it handles several states of automaton in parallel; when a synchronisation between two running states is required, it is processed when all states of the plan are in the same synchronisation state.
This way of handling plans is very close to the way chronicles are managed in [4] . It also has all the drawbacks of the chronicles. For example, no plan is deleted unless we have special operators that would provide a mean to break a recognition. It is thus necessary to define how to break partial plans and, thus, how to control the memory allocation. This is the purpose of the next section.
Partial Plan Deletion
We have designed several mechanisms in order to control the memory allocation, and thereby cancel partially recognised plans. The main problem of such an approach is ensuring that no important alert is missed. In order to ensure that the user of the ADeLe language knows exactly what he is doing, all plan deletions are explicitly controlled by the user. No implicit plan deletion is defined in the language.
3.5.1
Plan recognition break. Two operators exist whose goal is to reduce the number of partial pending plans.
The W ithout operator provides an explicit break rule: if the negative plan (cf Section 2.3.4) is recognised, positive plans that are pending are deleted from the set of pending plans.
The F irst operator ensures that a single event selected to fire a transition is the first of its type in the flow of audit events or alerts. Thus, if the previous example (cf. Figure 5 ) has been Sequence(First(A), NonOrdered(B, C)), the only detected signature would have been a 1 , b, c. From the point of view of the finite state automaton, no replication of a plan is produced when the A transition is fired. And no further a event can be taken into account unless the whole signature has been detected (Moreover, the recognition is re-initialised when the detection succeeds, and new a events can again, in this case, be taken into account).
3.5.2
Temporal plan break. Moreover, the temporal properties that are defined in the temporal context provide means of breaking plan recognitions. If temporal deadlines (cf. Section 2.3.6) are reached, the corresponding plans are deleted. This is the only way to break recognitions that do not contain explicit break operators. However, breaking recognitions using temporal deadlines is dangerous, because an attack can be intentionnaly performed during a long time period. Thus, it is possible for an attacker to avoid an IDS detection. However, in some situations (e.g., some repetitive worm attacks) these deadlines have a meaning, and provide a good temporal correlation context.
IDS Test
To Perform tests on an IDS, many points must be taken into account: false positives and false negatives generation, adequacy of the algorithms with real situation, etc. The tests that are proposed here only aim at stressing the detection algorithm. In this section, we illustrate the behaviour of the IDS in terms of plan number evolution. The Figure  6 describes the plan number evolution for a signature that describes the detection of a Sequence of two events and the same signature W ithout a recognition of one event. The signatures that we want to detect are mixed with a set of five hours of audit data items (these data were collected on a user machine in the laboratory, and reflect a common computer use). We can see that the evolution of the number of plans is approximately linear for the first signature. In the case of the second signature, the number of plans is limited to an upper bound. Thus, the "without" type signature provides a way of controlling the plan number evolution.
4.1.2
Plan Deletion Illustration. The Figure 7 shows the evolution of the number of plans when a T imeOut of one second is defined on the Sequence recognition. We see that every second, all plans that time out are deleted. This implies that the number of plans is contained under a maximum limit.
Advanced Tests
The tests that were defined include four attacks recognition in a flow of real audit data (five hours of audit data). Their role is to check if false alarms are generated (either false positives or false negatives). In order to perform these tests, we used a program that mixes real data flow with the signatures of the four attacks described. The Figure 8 shows the behaviour of the IDS when the fourth attack (RPCINFO attack) we have defined is mixed in a real flow of audit data items. We see that three alerts are generated instead of one. This was the worst case in the tests we have defined.
The results can be summarized as follows: the more precise a signature is, the less false positives we obtain. However no false negatives were encountered during this test: the attack signatures described in ADeLe were successfully detected. 
Related Work
The correlation approaches can be divided into three categories: the explicit, the semi-explicit and the implicit correlations.
The explicit correlation considers that an intrusion in a system can be described using several steps (the signature of events). Several works are using this type of correlation process: for example, Cuppens and Ortalo published an attack description language called Lambda [2] . It intends to describe all aspects of an attack against a system. Logweaver is a language driven tool that can analyse online event flows and correlate information [6] . Suthek is a logical language that is used to describe sequences of events in system audit traces [11, 12] . The chronicles have been used to correlate alerts [9] . They provide a way to describe sequences of events that can be detected in a system. This paper shows how correlation can be applied using the chronicles as detection and correlation language.
The semi-explicit correlation type generalises the explicit correlation by introducing the notion of attack pre-conditions and post-conditions. Lambda [2] proposes such notions.
The implicit correlation, unlike the explicit and semi-explicit approaches, tries to recognise and build attack scenarii. This can be, for example, found in [13] .
Conclusion
This paper relates our efforts to propose a fully functional intrusion detection system based on event and alert correlations. Among the several approaches available in the literature, we chose to implement a language driven signature based correlation. The correlation information is explicit and describes what are the different constraints between the events, either from a value or temporal point of view.
We have focused both on the ADeLe language functionnalities and on their implementation through the description of the IDS algorithms. Unlike other papers this implementation shows how an efficient recognition algorithm may be carried out in our field. In particular, the algorithm stress test proves that the algorithm can be adapted to a real life use (e.g., it can handle real-time correlation for active OS events).
In the context of the DICO project 2 , we are currently performing some IDS tests whose goal is to compare several similar IDS tools (Suthek, Logweaver, cf. previous section). These tests would eventually benefit to our work by proving that our language and implementation algorithms are consistent with the other existing works in this domain.
